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The success of modern business  is apparent,  but recently  there is much
concern in the business-and-society literature and in the general press on whether
business  fulfils  its  social  role  responsibly.  Business  ethics,  corporate  social
responsibility and corporate governance movements have been developed in recent
decades  as  responses  to  a  growing  sense  of  corporate  wrongdoing.  This  paper
attempts to explain why the three movements seem yet to have generated little in the
form of widely accepted prescriptions for improvement of business behaviour to the
satisfaction of the “constituents” of business, i.e. the major stakeholders.  Without
denying the usefulness of any of the three movements, the paper suggests that there
are weaknesses in all three, especially concerning the way they conceive modern
business operation.  To this end business pluralism, responsive codes of practice
and re-examination of the assumptions (conditions) of business operation could be
helpful. 
Keywords:  Business  Ethics;  Corporate  Social  Responsibility;  Corporate
Governance; Business Ideology; Business Conduct; Business Pluralism; Responsive
Codes of Practice; Conditions of Business 
JEL Classification:  M 140, D 210, G 340, L 000 
1.  Business success and its critics - the issue in context
In  the  business  literature  there  is  a  major  strand  that  celebrates  business
strength  and  seeks  formulae  for  success.   This  strand  was  manifested  in  the
Scientific  Management  tradition dating from Frederic Taylor’s  work in  the early
twentieth  century  (Taylor,  1911)  and  continued  through  the  Human  Relations
studies of Elton Mayo that sought to find growth through taking care of the “people
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dimension”   (Roethlisberger  and  Dickson,  1939).    The  tradition  was  further
developed following the publication by Peters and Waterman (1982) of their book
In Search of Excellence, and by Goldsmith and Clutterbuck (1985) in The Winning
Streak  and  by  the  movement  for  business  process  re-engineering  (Hammer  &
Champny, 2001)
 In contrast, a parallel discussion has always existed concerning the growth in
(compulsory  or  voluntary)  systems  and  organisations  established  for  regulating
international and national business, and indeed, for protecting consumers from some
of  the  effects  of  the  less  admirable  business  behaviour.   In  the  United  States,
antimonopoly legislation has existed, for example in the Anti-Trust laws from the
1880s. Consumer lobbies have successfully campaigned over the safety of motorcars
and many other issues.
However,  business  activity  has  also  raised  a  wide  range  of  critical  views
expressed  largely  in  the  communications  media.  The  presence  of  critiques  of
business activity is not a new phenomenon.   In particular, business activity by large
enterprises has always faced criticism.  Some of the critics have been internal1, but
other  criticism  is  extended  to  the  way  large  businesses  behave  towards  small
businesses and dominate consumers, suppliers and the labour market, for example2.
Some  of  these  issues  have  given  rise  to  legislation  and  to  regulatory  agencies,
designed to remedy particular problems or excesses that have been identified.  The
publication  of  the  International  Labour  Organisation’s  Labour  Standards  in  the
1920s resulted  from reports  of  abuses  as well  as from the  economic  disruptions
following the First World War.  These standards have often been reported as being
systematically and chronically evaded in many areas.
Following  these  criticisms,  three  movements  have emerged  in America  and
Europe in recent decades, which appear to offer ways of alleviating corporate abuse.
They have much in common, despite their different origins and different emphases.
They are: business ethics, corporate social responsibility and corporate governance.
The purposes of the present paper are:
1) to review these three movements in the light of the literature that serves them, and
in the light of the problems they seek to address;
2) to identify their similarities and differences;
3) to provide a summary critique based on the notion of business as an ideology that
could benefit from the introduction of a more pluralistic conception of the role of
business and management;
1
 In  the  early  twentieth  century,  Frederick  Taylor’s  Scientific  Management was  a  criticism  of  the
management  practices  of  the  day  as  inefficient.  Human  relations’  theorists  such  as  Herzberg  and
MacGregor, staple contents management education, criticised business and management as unable, for
behavioural  reasons,  to  provide  “productivity release”.   Modern  advisers  urge business  to strive  for
“competitive advantage” and “excellence” (See for example Peters & Waterman Jr., 1982).
2
 For an updated discussion of gains and losses of the modern business system, see Davis & Donaldson
(1998), Chapter 5, and Naomi Klein (2000).
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4) to explain why the three movements seem yet to have generated little in the form
of  widely  accepted  prescriptions  for  improvement  of  business  behaviour  to  the
satisfaction of the “constituents” of business, i.e. the major stakeholders.
2.  The  rise  of  business  ethics,  corporate  social  responsibility  &  corporate
governance
As mentioned in the outset of this paper, recently, i.e. in the last twenty years
or so, attention has been drawn to the idea that businesses also have obligations to
the wider communities.  This has been manifested in the (now well-organised and
articulated)  business  ethics  movement,  in  the  corporate  social  responsibility
movement,  and in  the corporate governance  movement.    Within  their  contexts,
concepts  such  as  stakeholders  and  codes  of  practice have  been,  and  are  being
developed.  These  three  movements  can  now  be  examined  in  the  light  of  the
literature that serves them, and in the light of the problems they seek to address in
order to identify their similarities and differences.
2.1.  Business ethics
Business ethics as a self-conscious (voluntary) way of looking at business has
shown a major growth since the 1980s.  In particular,  in the USA in the 1970s,
concerns were being voiced in relation to several developments:
• rising costs of litigation involving architects, accountants and lawyers3
• positive discrimination
• product safety (e.g. Ralph Nader’s  campaign on car safety)
• the “Watergate” scandal
• public sector strikes
• environmental issues (e.g. Environmental Protection Policy Act, 1969)
• “Whistleblower” issues4
3
 See for example the General Dynamics’ case, which in the mid-80s created the first corporate ethics
office in order to anticipate government investigations for pricing scams.  Although till the late 1980s
such initiatives were restricted in the defence industry which at that time faced high legal penalties, in
1991 the fact  that  federal  judges  in the USA were  empowered  to increase fines  in  cases  involving
companies that had loose or no rules in place to promote ethical behaviour, created similar incentives for
all industries.
4
 This is an alternative (albeit controversial) way to encourage business that conforms to legal and ethical
codes and expectations.  Whistle blowers as employees who are unable to resolve a problem with his/her
employer can report it as an unethical behaviour on the part of the employer.  It is worth noting that in
USA, laws usually do not allow employers to discriminate against or discipline whistleblowers.  A well-
known case brought about by whistleblowers is that of “Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America
Inc.”, which was enforced by law to pay $34 million in sexual -harassment settlement (see Miller, 1998,
June 12, The Wall Street Journal, p. B4). In Britain, the Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) provides
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• corporate bribery of foreign officials5
• transport disasters (e.g. Challenger spacecraft explosion in 1986)
• plant explosions (e.g. at Bhopal, India,19846; Seveso, Italy,1976)
One  of  the  consequences  of  such  events  as  these  -  usually  unintended  -
developments for businesses7 was a demand for the establishment of formal codes of
business practice. The Growth of corporate codes of ethics and of corporate ethics
officers8 was  thus  boosted  partially  by  the  fact  that  a  corporation  fined  several
million dollars could expect up to a 95% discount if had such a code and procedure
in place (Hagar, 1991, Vogel, 1992).  Today around 90 percent of Fortune 500 firms
have a corporate code of practice and many companies provide to their employees
guidelines for ethical decision making through corporate Web sites9. 
However, Business Ethics was late in catching on in Europe.  Now, although
there is great disparity between the North and the South, many European business
schools10 and most American, run business ethics programmes.  Recently, a regular
feature  in  the  London Times  was  an assessment  of  profiled  companies’  “ethical
expression”, on a scale of 1 to 10.  It is worth noting that there has been a European
Business  Ethics  Network  since  1987,  and  ethics  conferences  attended  by
representatives of “the great and the good”.
Some companies (e.g. “The UK Co-operative Bank”, “Beauty Without Cruelty”,
“The Body Shop”) have made their  ethical  stance a major marketing tool.  Some
examples, presumably successfully used marketing tools, are11:
some limited  support  for  whistleblowers.  A  distinction  is  sometimes made  between  internal  whistle
blowers  (held to be potentially beneficial for an organisation) and  external whistleblowers (potentially
harmful to the organisation).  On this, see Dunfee (1990).
5
 In particular, in the USA companies have been bound by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act since 1977.
Now  all  OECD  countries  have  joint  an  agreement  to  end  bribery  and  corruption. A  Transparency
International Corruption (including bribery) Perceptions Index (CPI) has recently been established.  CPI
presents a list of “the ten least and the ten most corrupt countries”.  An index score of 10.0 means a
totally  free  from  corruption  country  whereas  0.0  means  a  fully  corrupted  country.   In  2000 ninety
countries were studied and the USA had a CPI of 7.8 and ranked 14 th among the 90 countries studied. For
more detail, see www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/2000/cpi2000.html.
6
 In 1984 an explosion at a Union Carbide plant in India killed at least 8,000 people.
7
 The literature provides a wide array of case studies whereby business operations led to a number of
sanctions to businesses, i.e. monetary, criminal or other form of sanctions.  See, for example, Jennings
(1996) for an extensive elaboration of sanctions imposed by Indian courts to the Union Carbide operating
in Bhopal.
8
 Although a decade ago or so corporate ethics officers were barely existed - in 1992 the Ethics Officer
Association  had  twelve  members  –  now  they  have  become  indispensable  parts  especially  of  large
bureaucratic organizations. The Ethics Officer Association now has 650 members (The Economist 22-28
April 2000).
9
 See  for  example  the  case  of  the  Canadian  telecom  company  “Nortel”  in  the  Web  site:
www.nortel.com/cool/ethics/decision7.html.
10
 For  a database of  Universities  and Business Schools offering programmes that integrate into their
traditional business curricula ethics content, see www.csreurope.org and www.copenhagencentre.org.
11
 The examples have been taken from a selection of perspectives from a 1995 Conference in London:
The Ethical Customer. 
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• “Boots  Healthcare  International”,  which  emphasises  “safeguarding  the
ethical integrity of the organisation by developing a workforce that shares
corporate values”.  According to the Boots’ campaign “ethics” should be
taken into consideration in every decision.
•  “The Body Shop’s” focus on “deciding how you are going to measure your
ethical performance”, figures highly its intentions.
• “The  Co-operative  Wholesale  Society”  actively  seeks  to  identify  its
customers’ concerns and the retail chain. 
• “Out  of  This  World”  seeks  to  balance  “ethical  considerations  with  best
value”.
2.1.1. The nature of business ethics
There is no consensus as to the nature of business ethics.  In fact the business-
and-society  literature  shows  a  great  disparity  of  opinions12.   The  opponents  of
business  ethics  assume  that  they have  sufficient  grounds  for  rejecting  it.   Some
typical views are:
- “Ethics and business don’t mix  - business is a technical, not an ethical matter”13
- “It is naive to think that business will let ethics get in the way of making profits”14 
- “There are no ethical companies, because they all break the ethical rules from time
to time”15.
It is useful at this stage to note that business is driven by values.  Not all values
are  ethical in  the  sense  of  expressing  duties,  such  as  fairness,  or  honesty,  or
obligations to honour promises or contracts.  Some values are technical, expressing
skilled  operation of business.   Others are  prudential,  expressing a need to  avoid
unwanted repercussions or legal sanctions.   Some advocates of business ethics as a
discipline can be thought of as advocating “better” ways of encouraging or enforcing
conventional standards.  They may even propose new values or practices.  These
advocates  are  able,  logically,  to evaluate  business  operations  in these terms.  The
standards themselves are capable of analysis  in terms of the ethical  principles of
fairness,  honesty,  or  promise  keeping  (for  example).   The  standards  and  their
application are capable of analysis in terms of consistency, clarity and much else.
To do  so  is  to  do  business  ethics.   Thus,  everything  business  does  is  ethically
relevant.  Business can no more escape having an ethics than it can avoid having a
structure or reputation. 
12
 See for example Wood & Jones (1994).
13
 See for example Ullman (1985).
14
 See for example Milton Friedman (1962), who in his pioneering work Capitalism and Freedom (p.133)
expresses a narrower (and sceptical) view of business ethics.
15
 See for example De George (1986), p. 3ff for a characterisation and rebuttal of this view.
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It may be added further that16 :
- “the case against monopoly is always an ethical case (‘it distorts the market’, and is
an unfair practice in restraint of trade)”.  “Top business executives usually claim that
‘integrity’ (an ethical concept) is essential for business success” (and ‘success’ is a
value concept, as is ‘consumer sovereignty’). 
-  “politicians enact  laws governing business on the basis  of their  policies,  which
have  a  strong  ethical  ideology,  so  business  responses  must  address  the  same
language of good and proper practice”.
- “That a company breaks the law, as many do, does not make it illegal. Similarly, a
company that breaks an ethical rule does not make it wholly ethics-free or make
ethics irrelevant”. 
Even criminal gangs have ethical codes.  Conflicting ethical codes can co-exist in
the same community, but some dominate others (Donaldson, 2001).
 2.1.2.  The Business Ethics Debate
Systematic  handling of values of various kinds,  attitudes to business  ethics,
ethics and morals and their differences are all issues raised within the context of the
debate of business ethics. 
 The authors of this paper suggest that business ethics has two distinct meanings
or interpretations which can be termed “Ethics 1” and  “Ethics 2”.  These are not
often explicit and perhaps not always recognised.  “Ethics 1” concerns conventional
ethics.  A core question related to this is whether firms or individuals act according
to the values that are dominant in the culture in which they live.  If not, how can
they be persuaded or forced to do so?
“Ethics 2” relates to “evaluative ethics”. The following questions arise at this
point:  Are the dominant values defensible?  On what grounds?  In what ways could
or should they be evolved?  How, if at all, should they be enforced?
Further issues: 
Some  of  the  issues  related  to  business  ethics,  law  and  regulation  can  be
summarized within three different approaches17, namely relativism, subjectivism and
objectivism: 
Relativism  is the idea that ethics depend upon the time and place.  The main
perspective within the context of relativism is that what is obligatory in one country
or time can be seen as immoral in another (e.g. bribery, free markets,  monopoly,
slavery; hire-and-fire working relationships). 
Subjectivism is concerned with the idea that values are a matter of individual
taste and preferences.
In Objectivism the predominant idea is that there are at least some values that are
not  dependent  upon time  and  place  or  individual  whims.   These values  include
keeping promises, telling the truth, doing good and not harm, treating people as you
would want them to treat you, just to mention a few. 
The issues raised in the above-mentioned approaches have been the subjects of
long-running debates for millennia.  According to the authors of this paper, there is
16
 See Donaldson (2001), p. 629.
17
 De George (1986), Chapter 2; Donaldson (1989), p. xv, Chapter 4. 
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some truth in all the above, but they do not provide the whole truth.  For example
the fact (if it is a fact) that there may be groups of people somewhere in the world
who think that lying is essential to prosperity is only a fact.  However,  this fact-
finding does not prove they are right18. 
As  against  that,  the  observations  still  apply  that  universal  assent  proves
nothing true (John Locke, 1689)19 and furthermore that  values cannot logically be
derived from facts. (David Hume, 1739)20.
Many of the issues listed above as ethical are covered by various laws, such as
those relating to environmental protection, discrimination at work, safety, bribery or
monopoly.  So, Why is ethics needed as well?   The answer may be that laws are
derived from values such as those of governments  in office,  and, often, from the
values of the various pressure and interest groups that governments consult (OECD,
2001/1).
A  second  reason  may  be  that  the  law covers  only  some  of  the  rule-making
processes in business.  Businesses have their own codes of practice, whether written
down or not.    Business federations and trade associations also increasingly have
their  codes.   Some  do  so  as  a  result  of  pressures  from consumers,  or  to  avoid
legislation or the imposition of a regulatory authority21.
A third reason may be that it  would be too expensive to attempt to cover all
aspects of behaviour by laws, and to police them22.
The plurality of regulatory agencies, which exist, gives an idea of how states
and institutions try to refine notions of business misconduct.  Regulatory agencies
serve as intermediate institutions between businesses and the law.  Although they
may be set up by law, and often have powers to fine companies, they provide for a
great  deal  of  input  from  the  industry  concerned.   They  can  publish  discussion
papers, and usually have staff on secondment from the relevant industries.  Britain,
for example, has regulatory bodies for:
Electricity  and Gas supply (OFWAT and OFGAS),  Financial  services (Financial
Service Authority), Education (OFSTED), Rail operation, Water Supply (OFWAT),
Telecommuications (OFTEL), and Co-operatives and friendly Societies (Registrar
of Friendly Societies and Co-operatives) among others.
2.2. Corporate social responsibility
The  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  movement  is  not  well  articulated  in
Europe,  especially in  some Mediterranean countries23.   For  the promotion of the
movement  in  1995  the  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  Europe  network  was
18
 A careful discussion of the relevance of cultural differences and preferences to concepts of universal or
objective values can be seen in Finnis (1980), Chapter 4: “Theoretical studies of universal values”.
19
 Locke,  John (1689; Ed. J. Yolton, 1974), Chapters II: “No Innate Principles” and XVI: “Degrees of
assent and certainty”.
20
 This proposition is sometimes referred to as “Hume’s Fork” (Hume, 1739, Ed. Selby-Bigge, 1965).
21
 See for example Davis (1977).
22
 For example, many laws need to be supported by codes of practice, particularly in labour relations and
financial services, and by judicial decisions that clarify or make law.
23
 For  the  situation  of  the  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  Movement,  for  example,  in  Greece,  see
Fafaliou (2001); Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility (2001).
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launched aiming “to help companies to achieve profitability, sustainable growth and
human progress by placing in the mainstream of business practice.”
2.2.1.  Definitional aspects
There  are  many  definitional  problems  in  relation  to  the  Corporate  Social
Responsibility  concept.  It  is  often  used  in  the  modern  literature  as  a  summary
concept  whereby companies  integrate  social  and environmental  concerns  in  their
operations  and  in  their  interaction  with  stakeholders  on  a  voluntary  basis24.
According to this definition, for a company to be considered socially responsible
means  that  its  overall  performance  should  be  measured  on  a  triple  bottom line
approach that is to say on a firm’s combined contribution to economic prosperity,
environment quality and social capital. 
However, there is no general agreement concerning the concept of the “corporate
social  responsibility”,  therefore,  the  adoption  of  any  universally  applicable
definition seems to be ineffective25.   
In fact, as already noted, at the theoretical level there are claims that either
reduce business’ social responsibility to activities that maximize profitability only
for its shareholders, or extend responsibilities to cover the needs of the wider
stakeholders of an enterprise that affect or are affected by business’ operations. 
According to Prof. Milton Friedman (1962):
“…there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without
deception or fraud” (p. 133).
Professor Friedman’s views appear too narrow for many observers26. They are
considered as mostly to reflect the traditional views on the role of business, whereby
contribution to  society is  assumed  through the  provision of employment  and the
creation of wealth.   Any involvement in social activities is thus claimed to create
opportunity costs against profitable activity.
Diane  Flannery  (1996)27 summarises  the  Corporate  Social  Responsibility
Movement in the United States:
“In recent years a new generation of American corporations has evolved, both
large  and  small,  national  and  global,  that  firmly  defines  themselves  as  socially
responsible businesses, with a double bottom line, whereby the companies’ success
is measured both by its financial and social performance.  These corporations are
successfully  integrating  traditional  business  functions  with  aggressive  and  far-
reaching social goals.  The companies are redefining the notion of corporate social
responsibility and are raising important questions about the capacity of business to
serve multiple roles in society.  Years ago the number of American companies that
would define themselves this way was relatively small.   Recently,  in the field of
24
 See for example European Commission’s Green Paper (2001), p. 6.
25
 See for example CBI (2002).  In this report it is quoted: “any attempt to develop a “one-size fits all”
definition (of CSR) is therefore impractical”.   Furthermore,  The Dutch Social and Economic Council
(2001) defines the CSR concept as a sort of  “container term” whose definition may change over time.
26
 See, for example, Kitson & Campbell (1996), p.p. 140-141.
27
 Diane Flannery in  Ryan & Gasparski (2000), p. 47.
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professional practice, there has been an explosion of interest in this issue.  Business
for  Social  Responsibility,  a  membership  organisation  that  promotes  responsible
business practice, has grown tremendously.  Today, the organisation has over 800
member companies that represent over 2.75 million employees and well over $ 400
billion  in  annual  revenues:  a  major  evolution  from  its  humble  grassroots
beginnings.” 
According  to  the  British  Government’s  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry
(24.05.02):
“An increasing  number  of  companies  of  all  sizes  are  finding  that  there  are  real
business benefits from being socially responsible.  Corporate Social Responsibility
has  become  a  core  issue  for  many  large  businesses.   About  80% of  FTSE-100
companies now provide information about their environmental performance, social
impact, or both.
These trends are not confined only to big business; a recent MORI survey of
small and medium sized enterprises found that 61% were involved “a great deal” or
“a fair amount” in the local community. This isn’t happening by accident.  There is a
sound business case for social involvement.  The UK is fortunate to have excellent
support  organisations  helping  companies  become  involved.   And  Government  is
assisting with relevant  information on a wide range of issues,  as well as through
many other  specific  initiatives  across the whole  spectrum of the nation’s  biggest
issues.”
2.2.2.  The Corporate Social Responsibility debate: background
The academic debate over social responsibility has been launched within neo-
classical  economics.   The  main  issue  addressed  since  then  is  whether  business
socially responsible activity pays returns for corporate financial performance.  Up to
now,  there  is  no  general consensus  on  the  matter.   In  particular,  neoclassical
economists  have  claimed  that  there  is  no  (positive)  correlation  between
philanthropic action and profits.  Relevant  classical literature advocates that in the
long  term  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  has  positive  effects  on  business
performance28.  Furthermore, early in the 70s W. J. Baumol expressed the idea that
Corporate Social  Responsibility  was  a proper incentive  to  individual  firms,  other
than that created by market mechanisms, for the provision of public goods. 
Central  to  the  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  debate  is  measurement
problems. Most of the empirical surveys undertaken in the field since the-mid 70s
have been unable to establish a relation between Corporate Social Responsibility
activity and corporate financial performance29.  Due to this lack, the debate still goes
on.
2.3. Corporate governance30
2.3.1.  Some definitional issues
28
 See for example Steiner, (1980).
29
 See for example Starik and Carrol (1990), p.p. 1-15.
30
 For a comprehensive text on corporate governance, see Monks & Minow (2001, 2nd Edn.).
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“Corporate” has to do with a body of persons especially one authorised to act
as an individual.  A company is a legal person (“legal fiction”).  It can sue and be
sued.  But this raised a number of problems in relation to other branches of law (e.g.
in  terms  of  injuries  to  people,  and  the  issues  surrounding  transport  and  other
disasters, where attempts (unsuccessful, so far) have been made to sue companies
and directors for “corporate manslaughter”31.
The  ordinary  meaning  of  “governance”  concerns  the  act,  manner,  fact  or
function of governing, sway or control (Concise Oxford Dictionary). 
There are no technical uses for these terms.  “Governance” is an old-fashioned
word that has come to be applied, in public debate, to the behaviour of company
boards. Not just any companies, but to large ones, e.g. Public Limited Companies
(including very large “close”32 companies,  such as the Co-operative Bank).   The
large corporations and the small ones are all governed by law, and by their directors,
who are answerable in law to their shareholders.
2.3.2.  Corporate governance: background 
Corporate governance is the manner of general management and control of a
corporation, business or corporate body. Interest in corporate governance has a long
history in various contexts.  The expression came to be associated in the 1990s with
concern  over  many  ethical  issues  in  business,  and  some  business  scandals,
worldwide. 
Patrick Maclagan (1998)33 in his book Management & Morality has summarised
the background to modern discussions of corporate governance:
“In  the  aftermath  of  successive  business  and  public  sector  scandals  ...  practical
concern with corporate governance has emerged in recent years as a distinct focus of
attention.  It has been closely associated with the Cadbury Committee’s 1992 report
into financial management and accountability in listed companies. But governance
has a wider relevance than that, and a much longer history.  In the mid-90s Lord
Nolan’s  Committee  on  Standards  in  Public  Life  examined  the  governance  of
publicly-funded  bodies  (Nolan,  1995)  and  twenty  years  earlier,  the  Bullock
Committee  (1977)  reported  on  the  then  equally  topical  issue  of  industrial
democracy,  recommending  that  employees  and  shareholders  should  have  equal
directorial representation on company boards and that these directors should then
appoint  additional,  independent  members.   (These recommendations  did  not  take
effect due to opposition from the Confederation of British Industry and the fall of
the Labour Government in 1979).  The present Labour Government appears to have
no plans to revive the issues”.  
Maclagan adds that these initiatives have shared a common concern for two
things, the monitoring and control of managerial decisions and actions, and second,
the representation of stakeholders’ views. 
Corporate governance, as Maclagan points out, is a much wider topic than it
would appear from the topical reports that he mentions.   A problem that has not
been fully addressed in the literature is that of what makes a claim, e.g. a “say” in
31
 On the Zeebrugge ferry disaster, see Maclagan (1998),  p.p.106-114; Boyd (1990), p.p. 139-153 in
Enderle et al.
32
 i.e in this context, companies that are large, but whose share purchase is not open to the public.
33
 Maclagan, (1998), p. 151.
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management decision-making or in corporate governance, a legitimate one?  Should
a stakeholder have a “say” just because the stakeholder has a financial interest in the
behaviour of a business as an employee, shareholder, manager, supplier, customer or
neighbour?   Should  the  interests of  the  stakeholders  be  the  only  matters  of
significance?   If  so,  then  corporate  governance  would  be  largely  a  matter  of
calculating or negotiating benefits to the various stakeholders.
It is arguable that the various interested parties have other claims in addition to
their financial interests.  Directors of large or small businesses have long been held
to be motivated by more than salaries and benefits, however substantial they have
been come.  The corporate governance debate, especially in Britain has emphasised
the need for non-executive directors to decide the pay of directors.  This has been
regarded  as  particularly  important  in  the  light  of  many  examples  in  which  the
contracts of executive directors have permitted major increases in pay, bonuses and
share  options  despite  poor  performance.  Shareholders,  including  the  influential
institutional investors, have objected.  Several major investigations have produced
major debates.34
But  the  “ownership  versus  control”  debate35 and  many  contributions  to  “the
theory of the firm” have identified other motivations.  The economist W.J. Baumol
produced  arguments  in  the  late  1950s  to  the  effect  that  directors  were  more
concerned with maximising the size of the firm for prestige and control reasons36.
More than a decade later, Cyert and March (1970) drew attention to the life-style of
managers at work.  These suggest that  expectations of control, status and intrinsic
rewards are prominent.  All the above mentioned are matters on which managers are
likely to appeal to principles and to claim a right to exercise efficient stewardship in
everyone’s interests. 
Something similar can be said for other stakeholders.  The “green lobby” seeks
to influence governmental and corporate policies and decisions on the grounds of
‘eco-friendliness’ - on principles, rather than a claim for their own interests.  Trade
unions do seek financial gain, but like corporate directors, they have other values
that  wish  to promote.   They often cite principles,  such as “the rate for the job”,
protection  against  unfair  dismissal  (ethical  concepts)  along  with  claims  to  be
pursuing “legitimate interests”  - also an ethical concept.  A degree of control over
certain decisions, and the right to defend members caught up in disciplinary matters
are important to them.  These are not merely matters of calculative interests. They
are matters of principle, and the language of collective bargaining is replete with
ethical and persuasive uses of language.  Of course, not all parties accept the matters
of  principle  that  are  important  to  the  others.   Where principles  and interests  are
intermingled,  the problems of legitimate governance  and its acceptance are more
problematic than when financial interests alone are concerned. 
Corporate governance is  thus  a matter  of control according to a mixture  of
principles  and  interests.   The  principles  themselves  may  be  agreed  or  imposed.
Discussion of them may even be taboo in some corporations and organisations.
34
 Reports on the role  of  non-executive directors have included those of Cadbury (1992),  Greenbury
(1995), Higgs (2003).
35
 For an extensive discussion on the thesis of the separation of ownership (i.e. shareholders) from control
(i.e. directors and top-managers) see Florence (1961).
36
 Baumol (1959).
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2.3.3. Corporate governance in the modern context
In  joint  stock  companies  and  corporations  voting  is  on  a  basis  that  is
proportional to the amount of capital invested, by the holders of voting shares. The
result is  oligarchy, or rule by the few, or  hegemony, which is the pre-eminence of
one group among other groups.  They are both similar in their effects37. 
Corporate governance is much more than the determination of directors’ pay
and conditions and procedures for election to the board.  It involves the values and
expectations of the stakeholders of the business (Donaldson, 1989; Maclagan, 1998;
Monks & Minow, 2001). 
The complexities of modern markets and technologies require managers who
can provide a lead, and who need to be able to provide it on the basis of open and
agreed values, agreed with members, and with other stakeholders, if the outpouring
of corporate scandals is to be stemmed. 
3.  Assumptions of the three movements
All three movements  discussed above have some significant  assumptions  in
common.  These are the top-down assumption, the business ideology assumption and
the monoculture business model assumption.
3.1.  The Top-down assumption 
According  to  the  authors  of  this  paper,  chief  among  the  three  assumptions
identified in the three movements is that the approaches are “top-down” in nature.
Codes of practice, codes of ethics and their operation and control are devised by or
are taken on behalf of the leadership or directorates of powerful organisations and
businesses.   In  some  cases,  consumer  panels,  and  in  other  cases  collective
bargaining do provide for some input by others, but that input rarely, if ever, allows
control in any degree to pass to stakeholders other than top management.   To an
extent, this result seem to be inevitable, as boards of directors or their equivalents
are responsible at law for major aspects of business activities, but there appears to be
both a need and scope for more effective checks and balances.
3.2.  The business as ideology38 assumption
 “Ideology” refers to a body of ideas that is characteristic of a group, class or
nation.  Ideologies usually have untestable assumptions that adherents are expected
to accept without question.  They are usually impervious to critiques from outside.
Business  can  no  more  escape  having  an  ideology  than  it  can  escape  having  a
reputation, but both can be sound or flawed, justified or not, narrow or broad.  The
ideology  of  business  usually  includes  little  concept  of  stakeholding,  whereas
pressure groups are predicated on the concept in some form or other, as can also be
said for the pressures on governments to impose controls on business.  Ideology can
be more or less inclusive.
37
 For more information on the Hegemony or Oligarchy Model, see Donaldson (1999), p. 244.
38
 Business as ideology: a fuller discussion can be found in Donaldson (1999).
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3.3.  The monoculture assumption
The model of business as essentially driven by its owners (or, more usually by
its directorate) appears to lead to a monoculture, in which other forms of ownership
do not flourish.  Globalisation and the tide of privatisation that has been running
since  the  1980s  provide  examples39,  as  does  the  “flexible  firm”  that  came  to
dominate the labour market in the 1980s.
These characteristics are rarely challenged in the literature, and the business
ethics,  corporate  social  responsibility  and  corporate  governance  movements  and
literature appear in general to accept the assumptions.  As far as can be seen, these
assumptions are not challenged by the three movements, but rather are assumed to
be the inevitable conditions under which business operates, if they are considered at
all.  The dangers of monoculture are well known in agriculture and in international
trade40, but rarely considered in relation to business. 
In  relation  to  globalisation,  the  former  chief  economist  at  the  World  Bank,
Joseph Stiglitz (24.06.2002) comments:
“Globalisation today is not working for the world’s poor. It is not working for
much of the environment.  It is not working for the stability of the global economy.
The transition from communism to a market economy has been so badly managed
that, with the exception of China, Vietnam and a few Eastern European countries,
poverty has soared as incomes have plummeted. To some, there is an easy answer:
abandon  globalisation.  That  is  neither  feasible  nor  desirable.   Globalisation  has
brought huge benefits - East Asia’s success was based on globalisation, especially
on  the  opportunities  for  trade  and  increased  access  to  markets  and  technology.
Globalisation  has  brought  better  health  as  well  as  an  active  global  civil  society
fighting for more democracy and greater social justice.   The problem is not with
globalisation but with how it has been managed”.
Stiglitz claims that capital liberalisation in particular suits only some economies
at particular stages, and that reforms are needed to make it work better.  One point to
note here is that single global policies are seen by some observers to be technical
matters that need technical solutions to release the benefits that are supposed to be
available to all41. Others see them as matters for international trade liberalisation, to
be solved by international  agreement,  changes in law,  and in the policies of,  for
example, the World Bank and other international institutions42.   If either of these
views is correct, individual firms and their actions on corporate social responsibility,
ethical codes or governance styles are, at best of limited relevance.
It seems to us most likely that the problems of globalisation, and the business
monoculture that  it  appears to promote,  are typical  mixtures  of technical  matters
(including  issues  of  economic  organisation),  prudential  issues  of  safeguarding
39
 Concerning privatisation discussions, see for example Beesley & Littlechild (1994) in Bishop, M. J.
Kay & C. Mayer (eds).
40
 The Irish potato famine in the nineteenth century, when more than a million people died as a result of
the destruction by blight of the potato crop on which they were dependent (Japiske, 2002); destruction of
cotton crops in North American states 1890-1920 (Quarterman, 2002) are examples.
41
 See for example the guidelines to multinationals in OECD (2001).
42
 The international conferences and the protest groups who lobby them provide examples.
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successful systems to keep them viable, and ethical and value issues, mostly raised
on behalf of disadvantaged groups or nations.
4.  Some critical views
The  three  movements  that  promote  business  ethics,  corporate  social
responsibility,  and  corporate  governance  respectively,  have  developed  mainly  in
response to an apparent rise in corporate wrongdoing, or at least to a rise  in the
range and number of causes célèbres involving business. 
  Critical comments have included dissatisfaction with some general practices of
multinational  corporations  (Klein,  2000),  and  with  specific  events  and  specific
company  policies  (see  for  example  the  organisations  Pax  Christi  &  Amnesty
International, 1998 in discussions with Shell, especially in relation to Shell Nigeria
and  human  rights  issues).   These  latter  discussions  appear  to  have  improved
understanding at least between the parties concerned.
Grosman  &  Morehouse  (2000)  note  that  the  legal  perpetuity  accorded  to
corporations  weakens  the incentive  to behave well,  and contrast  the  permanency
with the earlier, limited operating licences required up to the 1880s.
On the idea of business ethics, and of social responsibility of business, Milton
Friedman  (1970)  famously  claimed  that,  “The  responsibility  of  business  is  to
maximise profits within the law.” 
Many critics point to the cynicism with which people regard many codes of
practice,  on the grounds that they are merely statements of what  businesses have
been doing or intend to do, or on the grounds that they are honoured more in the
breach than in the operation.43
5.  Strengths and weaknesses
5.1.  The strengths of the three movements
Despite the range, and continuing criticisms, general and specific of business
behaviour in large corporations and institutions, some positive assessments can be
made of the impact of the three movements:
• They have raised awareness of the issues and have sought ways of responding
• They  have  become  organised  into  coherent  arrangements  for  discussing  the
issues
• A large literature is developing
• Many organisations and institutions have issued “codes of practice” or “codes
of  ethics”  that  set  out  the  norms  of  behaviour  for  businesses,  professional
associations, government departments, and delegated agencies.
That  businesses  have  such  a  code  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  they  will
always  honour  it  in  spirit  and  letter,  but  there  is  at  least  a  possibility  that  its
43
 For a detailed discussion of codes of practice, see Donaldson (1989), Chapter 6 and (1992), Chapter 4.
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existence will exert a steady pressure to live up to the aspirations espoused in the
codes, although the pressure may be very slow acting.
5.2. The continuing problems and weaknesses include: 44
• pensions issues, such as mis-selling; lack of adequate coverage over time 
• the Andersen/ENRON crisis (independence of auditors/checks and balances)
• continuing cases of insider dealing in stocks and shares
• executive pay/performance (apparent breaking of links)
• world trade rules, held to give unfair advantage to the rich countries
• skewed distribution of rewards and welfare within and between countries
• monopoly and market abuse
• escalating executive rewards for failure, falling trust in executives, etc.
The continuing problems thus appear to be, at least in part, consequences of the
assumptions  (conditions)  of  business  operation  that  are  shared  by  the  three
movements. To say this is not to deny the relevance of the themes that dominate the
literature  of  business  ethics,  corporate  social  responsibility  and  corporate
governance.  Attempts  to  understand  individual  motivation  and  development,
problems of “whistleblowers” and awareness, legislation, company ethics policies,
the spread of knowledge and codes in these areas through symposia are all relevant.
That the issues continue, in some cases with increased intensity, suggests that there
are weaknesses in the way that the issues and their causes are currently conceived.
6.  Some ways forward / recommendations
The following ideas represent  some thoughts proposed as a step forward to
avoid present business misbehaviour:
• Pluralism in the form of business organisation  : This suggestion is based on the
idea that the form of business organisation that has become dominant is not the
only,  or  even  the  longest-serving  form.  While  directors  are,  in  principle,
responsible for the running of business,  the “managerial revolution” has long
been  noted.   Not  all  directors  have  the  same  influence,  and  the  corporate
44
 The list of problematic areas is drawn from reports in the daily press (see, for example, the article by
Patience Wheatcroft  The Times, London 13.06.02), annual reports of regulatory agencies, and from the
general literatures relating to the three movements under discussion.  The treatment in the literatures can
be seen  in  the many texts  and  journals.   Examples  include:  International  Journal  of  Value-Based
Management;  Journal  of  Business  Ethics;  Kitson  & Campbell  (1996);  Maclagan  (1998);  Donaldson
(1989); Davis and Donaldson (1998); Ryan & Gasparski (2000);  Casebooks include: Velasquez (1988);
Donaldson (1992); Jennings (1996).
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governance debate draws attention to the need to reform and / or reinforce some
major functions.  It is true that there is support for different forms of business
organisation: local enterprise, small businesses, co-operatives, etc., it has long
been  noted  that  access  to  capital  and  innovations  is  not  equal  between
corporations and other forms of enterprise.
• Responsive codes of practice   could also be helpful in the sense that they could
include identification of who the stakeholders are in each case, and what their
“proper aspirations” are.  The stakeholders could be included, along with their
active participation, in codes and their operation.  How what was termed above
the “proper aspirations” can be determined is a major problem in its own right,
but it will never be alleviated until it is more widely recognised.
• Terms of debate:   Re-examination of the assumptions (conditions) of business
operation to include the above would be timely.  The technical superiority of
“the market” over other forms of business conditions has been demonstrated.
However,  not  everything  that  happens  in  “the  market”  is  the  result  of
impersonal  market  forces.   It  is  a  managed  process.   Its  critics claim that  it
could  be  managed  better,  according  to  ethically  sound  principles.   The
impression remains that the criticisms (which are not all necessarily justified)
have been diverted, rather than answered by the three movements, presumably
as a result of the assumptions that have been taken for granted, or, perhaps, not
noticed.
7.  Conclusion and recommendations
Discussions  of  corporate  social  responsibility,  corporate  governance  and
business  ethics  have  yielded  many  reports,  and  created  many  networks  of
organisations dedicated to improvement of thought and practice in the areas.  There
has been much survey research administered through questionnaires on how the top
managers view many issues of the day, and on whether  they think that codes of
practice would be useful. There is much research on consumers’ buying habits, and
on  whether  consumers  would  buy  proposed  new  products,  including  service
products, and some is addressed to managers. 
Despite all the above, public cynicism on the operation of codes of practice and
of corporate governance is clearly visible45.  In an imperfect world there is always a
gap between the aspirations expressed in codes and their practical operation, but the
gap  could  be  reduced  by  detailed  research  into  their  formation,  monitoring  and
reception  by  their  intended  beneficiaries.   Many  processes  intervene  between
aspiration and reality.  Some of the processes are internal to particular businesses;
other are “fed in” by government, the law, pressure groups and much else. There
appear to have been few studies of how these processes work.  The following could
help:
• Reconcile  “agency  theory”46 with  “stakeholder”  theory.   Agency  theory  has
been  developed to  guide  agents,  such  as  accountants  in  making  judgements
about  what  is  in  the  interests  of  clients.  In  particular,  creating  bodies  that
represent  millions  of  consumers,  employees  or  suppliers  is  fraught  with
45
 For a review of discussions on the uses and limitations of codes, see Maclagan (1998), Chapter 11.
46
  Pratt & Zeckhauser (1984).
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difficulties.   Such  bodies  seem inevitably  to  develop  norms,  ideologies  and
control procedures that perpetuate the control arrangements of the organisation,
often  seeming  to  become  divorced  from the  original  intentions  (“functional
autonomy”,  informal systems,  “regulatory capture” etc), or from the views of
the “constituencies” that they represent.
• Develop “responsive codes of practice” that incorporate relevant parties in the
preparation, monitoring and amendment of codes.
• The extent of positive and negative influences of individuals.  Much effort has
been expended in making individuals aware of the consequences of their actions
or  inactions.  The  propensity  of  individuals  to  participate  or  acquiesce  in
corporate wrongdoing, or to benefit from unfair advantage is sometime cited.  It
seems to us that there are no good reasons to believe that the propensity has
become more widespread or more powerful over the last few millennia.   But
opportunities have clearly increased with the abolition of the old controls that
governed business behaviour before the era of globalisation, before the ending
of the gold exchange standard in the 1970s and before the digital revolution.
On this basis, providing opportunities for executives to contemplate the ethical
aspects of their actions can have only limited effects.  But there are few grounds
for asserting with confidence what the majority of players in the business field
want, as suppliers, customers or employees, or as recipients of the consequences
of business operation.  More knowledge of expectations, and of how to assess
their legitimacy would be of great value.  It is possible that the expectations
would turn out to be quite modest.
As Aristotle put it, “The conclusion of a moral argument is an action”.
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